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while others fail.  
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Micro-strategies of Contextualization: 
Cross-national Transfer of Socially Responsible Investment 
 
INTRODUCTION 
How do business practices become contextualized when they are transferred from one society 
to another? Decades of research on the cross-national transfer of business practices 
demonstrate that practices change during the transfer process. They may keep their original 
label, but the actual practices change when they are implemented in other institutional 
contexts (Djelic 1998). Institutionalized patterns in the host society apparently play a 
determinant role in this change process. Yet, even if institutions in the host society are well 
known at the time of transfer, it is not yet possible to predict whether a transfer will succeed, 
nor how a business practice will change once it is transferred. These shortcomings persist 
because of gaps in our understanding of the transfer process.  
Different lines of inquiry have investigated transfer processes and come to alternative 
conclusions. Propositions span from structural determinism to accounts that emphasize human 
agency. Although the accounts differ significantly, there is broad consensus that business 
practices are combined with elements in the host society during a transfer. We refer to this 
process as contextualization. Contextualization occurs when business practices are entangled 
with elements from a new context, which give them new shape and meaning, and ultimately 
provide them with their context (Latour 1996a: 133). Contextualization is required to fit 
transferred business practices to the institutional order in the host society (Casper & Hancké 
1999; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jacoby 2000; Streeck 1996). Empirical research on 
contextualization, translation, and institutional transfers provide some insights into how this 
fit is accomplished, but further research is needed on the role of agency in this process, 
particularly research that is conducted in real time and involves direct observations (Zilber 
2006). 
 4
The present empirical study relies on both retrospective and real-time data to illuminate 
contextualization. Our object of analysis is the transfer of Socially Responsible Investment 
(SRI). SRI refers to the act of investing in companies whose business practices are deemed to 
be socially responsible. This practice, which has a fairly long history in United States 
(d’Antonio et al. 1998), has been transferred to other societies in recent years. We investigate 
two transfers of SRI to France and Quebec. The analysis reveals interesting commonalities in 
how individuals selected and mobilized local institutions when they contextualized SRI to two 
different host societies. These commonalities are captured in a repertoire of five micro-
strategies that individuals drew upon to contextualize the transferred practice. These micro-
strategies are: (1) Filtering, (2) Rerouting, (3) Stowing, (4) Defusing, and (5) Coupling. We 
define each micro-strategy and analyze its role in each case. The analysis brings together 
insight from disparate research traditions to propose an account of how individuals engage 
creatively with institutional structures in the transfer process.     
The paper starts with a review of some important features in the literature on cross-
national transfers. It proceeds with a presentation of the methodology and the rationale for our  
research design. It subsequently presents the five micro-strategies that we identified and 
illustrates how they were used to contextualize SRI in France and Quebec. The discussion 
section relates our findings to previous research on contextualization, translation, and 
institutional transfer, showing how they extend all three literatures. The conclusion proposes 
an integrated account of contextualization and points out directions for future research and 
improved managerial practice. 
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Transfers across societies 
Previous studies of cross-national transfers emphasize the role of structural factors in the 
transfer process (Casper & Hancké 1999; Djelic 1998; Hall & Soskice 2001; Jacoby 2000; 
Streeck 1996). They show how institutional structures at the societal level of analysis shape 
the transferred business practice into one that is compatible with institutions in the host 
society. An important line of inquiry within this tradition is that of Varieties of Capitalism or 
Business Systems Theory (Whitley 1998, 1999). This tradition emphasizes the type of 
capitalism that governs the production regime in a nation. Using a comparative approach to 
production regimes, researchers demonstrate that transferred business practices take shape 
after the production regime in the host society (Casper & Hancké 1999; Djelic 1998).  
Institutionalist research shows that transfers proceed most easily between similar 
societies. Societies may be similar because they adhere to the same variety of capitalism (Hall 
& Soskice 2001) or because they construe themselves as symbolically similar (Strang & 
Meyer 1994). For example, two nation states may perceive themselves to be similar, even 
though their production regimes differ, due to a shared structural position on the global 
market.  
Transfers are apparently more difficult between societies that perceive themselves to be 
dissimilar. Some studies find that it is almost impossible to transfer business practices across 
very different social settings (Westney 1987; Guillen 1994; Orru et al. 1997). The foreign 
practice may simply not make sense to members of the host society (Biggart & Guillen 1999: 
726). It risks being considered immoral or irrational as a consequence (Biggart & Beamish 
2003: 448). In contrast, other empirical studies find evidence of business practices that have 
been successfully transferred to even very dissimilar societies (Casper & Hancké 1999; Djelic 
1998; Djelic & Quack, 2003; Lippi 2000). These studies attribute success to the fact that the 
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business practices were fitted well to institutions in the host society, meaning that they 
highlight the importance of contextualization. 
 
Transfers as Contextualization 
Another line of inquiry emphasizes symbolic and ideational dimensions of transfers (e.g., 
Brannen 2004; Czarniawska & Joerges 1996). This approach is predominant in the literature 
on New Institutional Theory and Actor-Network Theory. Studies of contextualization seek to 
identify how symbolic elements shape the meaning of transferred business practices, 
providing them with a new context. Individuals evoke symbolic elements like beliefs, norms, 
values, language and artifacts in this process of contextualization. 
Contextualization is sometimes initiated by individuals outside the state structure who 
sponsor or pull in a foreign practice because they see unexpected opportunities that suit their 
own material or moral ends (Jacoby 2000: 20-21). They rely on individual perceptions and 
strategies to do so (Creed et al. 2002; Frenkel 2005; Zilber 2006: 300). The literature on 
transfers has identified two main strategies of contextualization. One strategy is to remove 
undesirable elements from an original practice to increase its appeal in a specific host society 
(Westney 1987) or to give it general appeal in societies that may adopt it (Sahlin-Anderson 
1996). Another strategy is to add local elements to the transferred practice to make it more 
meaningful and acceptable in the host society (Boxenbaum 2006; Campbell 2004; Casper & 
Hancké 1999; Lippi 2000). 
These two strategies shed some light on contextualization and offer a valuable 
foundation for analyzing the role of institutions in the transfer process. However, they give an 
insufficient account of the strategies that individuals employ to successfully transfer a 
business practice across dissimilar societies. For instance, why do individuals choose to 
combine a transferred practice with one local practice rather than another? There are always 
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several practices available for combination, hence several ways to contextualize a foreign 
practice. We need a finer resolution to explain the particular shape that a business practice 
takes during a transfer. This insight may explain why some transfers between dissimilar 
societies succeed while others fail. It may also enable managers to transfer practices more 
effectively across dissimilar societies. 
We propose to investigate this gap in the literature through an empirical study of 
contextualization, conducted at the micro-level of analysis. Our aim is to obtain detailed 
insight into the process of contextualization, and, by doing so, to capture the role of 
individuals in the contextualization process. The empirical study explores the range of 
strategies that individuals deploy to contextualize a business practice that has been transferred 
from a dissimilar society. Since more contextualization is required of individuals when they 
transfer practices across dissimilar societies, more insight can potentially be gained from 
studying transfers between dissimilar societies. Our study is thus designed to addresses an 
important limitation in previous research on cross-national transfers.   
 
METHODS 
The object of transfer 
The object of transfer is that of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI). SRI represents a 
contemporary case of transfer, which permits data collection on individual perceptions and 
strategies while they are still fresh in the minds of informants. SRI refers to “a set of 
approaches which include social or ethical goals or constraints as well as more conventional 
criteria in decisions over whether to acquire, hold or dispose of a particular investment” 
(Cowton 1999: 60; d’Antonio et al. 1998). As a practice, SRI refers to the assessment that 
financial investors make on the social responsibility of corporations. This assessment relies on 
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data made available by firms, which are interpreted in light of certain principles, norms and 
conventions that are related to SRI.  
The roots of SRI stretch back to the 17th century when the Quaker community in United 
States opposed investment in activities that contradicted their values, such as war-related 
activities or slavery (d’Antonio et al. 1998; Louche 2004). The SRI movement was revitalized 
in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s in response to the Vietnam War and Apartheid in 
South Africa (Giamporcaro 2004). From 1984 to 1988, investments in SRI products in the 
United States increased from USD 40 to 400 billion (Social Investment Forum 2003, 2005). 
They have continued to increase during the 1990s and now represent more than 10 percent of 
all investments. In 2002, American SRI assets amounted to about USD 2 trillion, 
approximately two-thirds of SRI assets worldwide (Committee of Public Finance 2002). 
The practice of SRI has spread across the western world in recent years. SRI 
terminology first appeared in New York Times in the late 1980s. About a decade later, it 
appeared in newspapers in France and Quebec (see Figure 1). This pattern indicates a transfer 
of SRI from United States to France and Quebec.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
France had seven SRI funds in 1997; this number grew to 42 in 2001 and to 118 in 2004 
(Muet et al. 2002; Novethic 2004). From 1997 to 2004, total SRI assets grew from 0.2 billion 
euros to 3 billion euros, despite a general stagnation in the French investment market in this 
period (Novethic 2003, 2004). SRI represents approximately 1.5 percent of all French 
investments today.  
In comparison, Canada had more than 30 ethical investment funds in 2002 (Committee 
of Public Finance 2002). The Canadian SRI market is growing twice as fast as the mutual 
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fund market as a whole and Canadian SRI assets amounted to approximately CAD 50 billion 
in 2002 (ibid) and CAD 65 billion in 2004 (Association Investissement Responsible 2005). 
Quebec is just beginning to establish a formal SRI market. However, Quebec has a long 
history of making socially responsible investment in its own economic development under 
different labels, such as ‘social economy’ (Neamtam 2005). Different terminology may blur 
the picture somewhat on the prevalence of SRI in different societies. 
 
 
Selection of host societies   
The host societies, France and Quebec, represent two cases of transfer between dissimilar 
societies. The institutional structures of France and Quebec differ from the institutional 
structure of United States. In terms of production regime, France represents a state-centered 
variety of capitalism that differs from the liberal market economy of the United States 
(Schmidt 2003). Quebec has developed its own economic model, locally known as the 
‘Quebec model’ (Lévesque 2004). This model assigns an important role to civil society, local 
entrepreneurs, and labour unions in the production regime, which reflects the features of a 
coordinated market economy (Hall & Soskice 2001). The Quebec model was developed in the 
1960s as a tool for gaining institutional autonomy within Canada. It still carries strong 
symbolic value as an economic model that differs fundamentally from the liberal market 
economy of the United States and federal Canada. In terms of ideas and symbols, France and 
Quebec also construe themselves as dissimilar to the United States, sometimes in direct 
opposition to American norms, beliefs, and values.  
  
Case selection 
Our research design relies on theory-building from multiple case studies (Eisenhardt 1989; 
Yin, 2003). Two cases were selected for in-depth analysis, one in each host society. They are 
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cases of small entrepreneurial companies that transferred SRI and developed an SRI 
assessment tool that fit their own society. The French case is ARESE, a small entrepreneurial 
company that was created in 1997 to measure the corporate social performance of companies 
that were quoted on the stock market. The mission of ARESE was to provide structured, 
quantified information to SRI fund managers to help them select the most ethical or 
responsible companies for their investment portfolio (Igalens & Gond 2005). ARESE was the 
first formal initiative to quantify and legitimize the notion of corporate social responsibility 
within the French financial community (Déjean 2004; Déjean et al. 2004; Giamporcaro 2004). 
The Quebec case is that of Fonds d’Investissement Responsable (FIR), a socially 
responsible investment fund that was created in 2003. FIR’s mission was to evaluate the 
financial, social and environmental sustainability of small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in Quebec and make investments in the most promising ones, using risk capital. Half 
of the capital was provided by two labour pension funds in Quebec. The other half came from 
public funds for environmental protection that was transferred from a non-governmental 
organization. FIR sought to develop an SRI assessment tool that would foster sustainable 
development of the Quebec economy.  
Both transfers are examples of a successful transfer of SRI to the respective societies, 
one of the first successful attempts, in fact. The two transfers unfolded independently and 
several years apart. SRI was transferred to France in the late 1990s and to Quebec around 
2002. Both cases capture the whole process of transfer from the United States to the 
respective host society. In fact, the American context played an important role in both 
transfers. The founder of ARESE had spent a long time in the United States prior to this 
initiative, while the founder of FIR deliberately downplayed the American roots of SRI.   
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Data sources  
Interview data is one of the best ways to gain access to individual perceptions and strategies. 
Interviews are particularly useful if conducted close to the time of the transfer while 
interviewees still recall the details of the process. We first identified key individuals involved 
in the two transfers. They included internal members of the firms, e.g., the CEO, financial 
analysts, and board members. They also included external constituents such as sustainable 
development managers of evaluated companies, socially responsible fund managers, and 
managers of partnering organizations. The interviews inquired about their perceptions of the 
transfer and their strategies for overcoming obstacles. In total, we conducted 24 semi-
structured, retrospective interviews in the ARESE case and 11 semi-structured, in-situ 
interviews in the FIR case.  
Retrospective interviews are useful because they capture the full process of a transfer 
from beginning to end. However, people easily forget what happened a few years back and 
give vague or incomplete accounts of their strategies (Barley, 1986). In addition, interviewees 
may distort the picture in light of the known outcomes. They may inflate their intentionality 
more or less deliberately to present themselves in a positive light. Real-time interviews 
control for these two weaknesses. Details are more vivid when people are still engaged in the 
transfer process. They are also less inclined to inflate intentionality when the outcome of their 
efforts is not yet known. However, real-time interviews may omit politically sensitive details 
that can better be revealed in retrospect. Hence, real-time interviews compensate for potential 
weaknesses in retrospective interviews, and vice-versa. 
In our study, the real-time interviews were conducted at a politically precarious time for 
FIR. To minimize the likelihood that interviewees would withhold relevant information, we 
protected the anonymity of informants and organizations by using proxy names. In the French 
case, we conducted the interviews after ARESE merged with VIGEO in 2002, which made it 
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easier for interviewees to express themselves freely. We also verified the factuality of all 
interview data by comparing it to other data sources. For this purpose, we collected 182 
newspaper articles that cited ARESE, observed group meetings of FIR, and consulted 
company reports for both companies. These measures enhanced the data quality and the 
internal validity of the study.   
 
Data analysis 
The interviews revealed that some individuals were more actively involved in the transfers 
than others. Some individuals gave detailed accounts of their perceptions and strategies while 
others were more general in their account. We identified the CEO as a key actor in both 
transfers and selected the two CEO interviews for in-depth analysis. We first reconstructed 
the transfer process, using a stage model of translation. This model, developed by 
Czarniawska and Joerges (1996), comprises three consecutive steps: selection, objectification 
and materialization. Selection occurs when individuals choose an idea that seems promising 
for alleviating an organizational problem. “Organizational actors, like a collective ant-eater, 
catch many, spit out most, and savor some [ideas], presumably on the grounds of relevance to 
some organizational problem” (1996: 25). Objectification consists in assigning a label to a 
selected idea so that it may be understood collectively. “The simplest way of objectifying 
ideas is turning them into linguistic artifacts by a repetitive use in an unchanged form” (1996: 
32). Ideas crystallize somewhat when they acquire a fixed terminology. Materialization is the 
act of turning objectified ideas into quasi-objects. A SRI assessment tool is a quasi-object 
because it transforms an idea into practice. Materialization is “this magic moment when 
words become deeds” (1996: 41). We used this model as an analytical framework to recreate 
the two transfer processes. It generated two detailed narratives of contextualization. Table 1 
summarizes key elements at each stage of the two narratives.  
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INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
We subsequently coded the two narratives of contextualization to identify strategies that 
were employed at each stage of the process. Using open coding, we grouped the strategies 
into five groups and assigned a descriptive label to each one. Each label represents one micro-
strategy. Collectively, the five micro-strategies constitute a repertoire of micro-strategies that 
the individuals used to contextualize the transferred practice. We controlled for post-
rationalized categories by verifying that each micro-strategy appeared in the real-time data. 
We also controlled for missing categories by coding the remaining interviews. No micro-
strategy was added or eliminated as a consequence of these two procedures.   
 
RESULTS: FIVE MICRO-STRATEGIES OF CONTEXTUALIZATION 
Our analysis revealed that individuals employed the same micro-strategies to contextualize 
SRI even if their individual perceptions and institutional contexts were different. The 
contextualized SRI practice took different form in the two host societies, but the micro-
strategies of contextualization were the same. We identified five micro-strategies, namely  (1) 
Filtering, (2) Rerouting, (3) Stowing, (4) Defusing and (5) Coupling. We define each micro-
strategy below and illustrate how it was employed in each transfer. Table 2 summarizes our 
research findings.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Filtering 
Filtering occurs when individuals eliminate or downplay features of the original practice that 
may block its entry into the host society. These features may be specific practices, beliefs or 
 14
values that carry negative connotations in the host society. Filtering serves to eliminate 
features that may block the transfer, alternatively replace them with a softer notion. It 
disentangles elements that the host society may perceive as illegitimate.   
In its original form, SRI advocates synergy between profit-making and social gains. 
This synergy did not resonate in Quebec where the two elements were historically construed 
as being in opposition to one another. Until the 1960s, the francophone population of Quebec 
was primarily employed as unskilled workers in factories that were owned and managed by 
the Anglophone community. While Anglophones profited from these factories, the 
Francophone community expressed feelings of oppression and exploitation in this production 
regime. They developed negative sentiments towards liberal market economies, which they 
associated with profit, capitalism, large factories, management, power, and money. In fact, the 
United States is a liberal market economy that assigns much value to profit making and gives 
prominence to this element in business practices. The strong emphasis on profit making in 
SRI met resistance in the coordinated market economy of Quebec, where it was easily 
associated with exploitation of workers and lack of democracy.  
Although the negative sentiments toward liberal market economies have diminished 
somewhat over the past decades in response to growing institutional autonomy in Quebec, the 
Francophone community still harbours negative feelings towards money, power, and profit:  
“The reality of this country [Quebec] is that no Francophones had power. Nor money, for 
that matter. There were priests, notaries, doctors and liberal professions who did, but the 
rest of us did not touch money. They were dirty. They served to exploit others. I felt that 
way myself when I was 10 years old and wanted to be a communist. Now, at 35, I tell 
myself, I want to take charge of money myself.” (CEO of FIR)   
 
The CEO engaged in filtering to minimize the prominence of profit making in the SRI 
concept. She downplayed the American origin of SRI, presenting it instead as a global 
business practice associated with the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
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Johannesburg. In addition, she always made mention of social gains in relation to profits and 
sometimes replaced the notion of synergy with the idea that profits lead to social gains:  
“When this project starts to make money, the part of that money that belongs to the 
environmental organization will be reinvested in environmental groups and educational 
projects. The money we generate will sustain the survival of the environmental 
organization.” (CEO of FIR) 
 
This subordination of profit making to social goals fitted better with the dominant ideology in 
Quebec. It made SRI more legitimate and desirable in this society. 
The organizational development in the French case also relied extensively on filtering to 
develop an evaluation tool for the purpose of socially responsible investment. The CEO of 
ARESE faced the French financial market where mainstreams investors perceived moral and 
religious claims related to SRI with some suspicion. Prior to the formal creation of ARESE, 
she had travelled to the United States and other European countries to deepen her knowledge 
of SRI. She identified some dimensions of the American SRI practice that she perceived to be 
potentially exportable, others that she deemed culturally incongruent with French society. As 
she stated:    
“I realized that the model was extremely militant... and really difficult to export. The 
model of [socially responsible] investment was marked by values directly inherited 
from puritanism or civil rights engagement. So, it was something really embedded in 
the American and Anglo-Saxon culture. On the religious side, it was the Quakers, on 
the civil side, it was related to the problem of minority discrimination and inspired by 
Luther King, on the consumer side, it was Ralph Nader. The three leverages were a 
racial leverage, consumerist leverage and a religious leverage… With these 
approaches, the evaluation method was not of importance, and this value-based 
legacy was really not exportable. On the contrary, the financial leverage of pension 
funds appeared very credible to me.” (CEO of ARESE) 
When preparing the business plan of ARESE, she and her team carefully removed the overtly 
moral and religious elements in the American SRI construct, highlighting instead the technical 
dimensions of corporate evaluation. They constructed a quantitative methodology that was 
susceptible to pass as morally neutral in French society, an emphasis that resonated well with 
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French investors and facilitated their acceptance of SRI (see Déjean et al. 2004 and Gond & 
Leca 2005). 
 
Rerouting 
Rerouting assigns new purpose to a foreign business practice. It changes the meaning and/or 
the function of a business practice to make it desirable in the host society. Individuals may 
recast a business practice to make it reflect local values and beliefs, creating links between 
that practice and well established myths in the host society (see Brannen 2004; Zilber 2006). 
Alternatively, individuals present the foreign business practice as a solution to a recognized 
problem in the host society. Both instances of rerouting assign a new raison-d’être to the 
original business practice. 
In the French case, the more striking instance of rerouting is the choice that ARESE 
made to shift the methodology from negative screening to positive screening. Negative 
screening consists in identifying firms that make money in industries that are considered 
immoral, e.g. alcohol and tobacco, and in encouraging investors to exclude these firms from 
their portfolio (Giamporcaro 2004). Positive screening consists in identifying firms that 
perform best on a set of social and environmental criteria in any given industrial sector and in 
encouraging investors to include these firms in their portfolio. Negative screening is still 
dominant in the United States (see SIF 2005: 8), reflecting the religious and political elements 
of SRI that are also conveyed in social movements that aim to change corporate behavior and 
consequently society (see Schepers & Sethi 2003; Vogel 1978).  
When ARESE replaced negative screening with positive screening, it radically 
transformed the meaning of SRI from a moral device to a managerial tool. SRI became a tool 
for assessing extra-financial corporate performance in order to increase longterm financial 
performance. As an ARESE analyst reported: 
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“She [the Founder/CEO of ARESE] always told us: ‘we cannot sell that [SRI] in the 
name of ethics, we have to sell it as a financial product. This is a tool that will be put 
to use. Our goal is to inform investors, not to convey ideological or moral 
convictions’” (ARESE, Analyst B) 
 
The previous employer of the founder/ CEO of ARESE was a native of the United States and 
had been engaged in SRI consultancy in California since the 1980s. He confirmed this radical 
transformation of SRI. Sceptical that positive screening could contribute much to the 
promotion of social change, he expressed his divergent viewpoint and the importance of 
national context in the following words: 
“We had some arguments with [the future founder/CEO of ARESE] about the technical 
aspects, the methodology and even the general logic [of social evaluation] ….The 
problem comes from a very different view of what ‘social’ means in North America and 
in continental Europe, and also from the total absence of a logic of affirmative action in 
France” (Consultant A, former employer of the CEO of ARESE)  
 
By rerouting SRI from negative screening to positive screening, the entrepreneurs made the 
practice fit better with the institutional context of France.  
Rerouting also enabled the Quebec transfer of SRI. To emphasize the feature of social 
gains, the CEO selected a social purpose that already carried much value in Quebec society. 
SRI would be another piece of evidence that the economy can be organized in a way that is 
more humane than a liberal market economy. This rationale reflected the ‘Quebec model’ and 
decades of efforts to gain institutional autonomy and independence from Canada. The CEO 
saw in sustainable development an opportunity to demonstrate the viability of an alternative 
production regime: “I want to make sure that the firms we finance represent a model of 
sustainable development at all levels, as much social as environmental and economic.” This 
rerouting connected SRI to dominant values, beliefs and practices in Quebec.  
     
Stowing 
Stowing consists in aligning the foreign business practice with a social movement or a current 
trend in the host society. Social movements and new trends carry positive energy that benefits 
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practices associated with them. Stowing occurs when individuals align a foreign business 
practice with a social movement or a current trend to use its mobilizing force to facilitate the 
transfer. It is metaphorically similar to stowing tree trunks down a river (Cochoy, 1999). 
Stowing facilitates acceptance of a transfer and infuses it with energy and meaning.  
Stowing was employed already at the launch of ARESE in 1995. The founder/CEO 
aligned SRI with the financial market liberalization that was taking place in France at the 
time, benefitting from the energy of a pending reform. She organized a business trip for 
financial executives from two French banks associated with the public sector: the Caisses de 
Dépôts et Consignation (CDC) et the Caisses d’Epargne (CE).  The purpose of the trip was to 
introduce the financial executives to innovative ideas and techniques in the American 
financial market. The founder/ CEO dedicated the last day entirely to SRI, and executives 
responded with enthusiasm. They perceived the notion of SRI as an opportunity to reconcile 
social concerns (social welfare in a public service ideology) with institutional investment 
(new commercial products and profitable markets), two dimensions that had proven difficult 
to reconcile in the liberalization of the French financial markets (Schmidt 2003). 
Two managers who attended the business trip played a central role in stowing. They 
financially supported the development of ARESE and the transfer of SRI to France. The two 
financial institutions also showed interest in developing the emerging market of employee 
savings in light of the pending reform of French pension funds. Newspaper reports from the 
late 1990’s made explicit links between SRI and the reform. In a newspaper article, published 
in Le Monde, SRI professionals expressed that they “feel ready to provide an answer to the 
demand for socially responsible pension funds [if they are created]” (Le Monde 1998). By 
means of stowing, the ARESE project was connected to strong institutional forces for social 
change in French society, which greatly facilitated the transfer. 
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Stowing also facilitated the transfer of SRI to Quebec. FIR was launched shortly after 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg in August 2002. The 
World Summit carried momentum as a social movement for environmental protection and 
was drawing political attention around the world. The CEO, who attended the meeting in 
Johannesburg, saw an opportunity for stowing in this movement. She adopted the Life Cycle 
Approach, a tool for calculating the pollution that a product generates during its life cycle. 
Although she was already familiar with this approach beforehand, she adopted it after the 
Johannesburg meeting for two reasons. One reason was its functionality for the purpose at 
hand:   
“I first heard about the Life Cycle Approach two years ago, but I did not explore it that 
much. Now I am facing a real problem because sustainable development is really huge. 
People tell me ‘it can mean anything’, so I asked myself which tool I can use to avoid 
that. I want to be able to explain why we say yes, why we say no. And the Life Cycle 
Approach is rigorous. It is a model and when you apply it, you definitely do sustainable 
development. You prevent problems.” (CEO of FIR) 
 
Another reason was that it was gaining momentum as a new standard: “The Life Cycle 
Approach did not exist at Rio. It started at Johannesburg. And it is great because it is now a 
movement and it is clear that it will become a standard.” She benefited from this movement of 
standardization and the World Summit to facilitate the transfer of SRI to Quebec. 
   
Defusing 
Defusing is a response to a pending threat in the host society. Individuals engage in defusing 
when they transfer a practice to protect against a widely accepted threat, whether real or 
perceived. If a business practice has proved successful elsewhere, then it raises hope that it 
can alleviate problems in the host society. Once the business practice is perceived as useful, it 
becomes valuable and attractive, which facilitates its transfer.   
In Quebec, the rise of multinational companies on the global market represented a threat 
to the local economy. Liberal market economies were perceived as a destructive force, 
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probably because of the historical experience with Anglophone oppression. The common 
response in Quebec was to resist liberal market economies and practices associated with them. 
SRI originated in a liberal market economy and was therefore a practice that should be 
resisted, an expectation that did not escape the CEO:  
“I’m scared that people will say that I’m corrupt because I’m not choosing resistance. 
When I presented the project to the board of the environmental organization that I was in 
charge of, one of the board members said that he was not in favour of it. I asked why, and 
he answered that, ‘well, okay, because you buy into the establishment’. He had strong 
principles on this. He is anti-globalization, anti, anti, anti.” (CEO of FIR) 
        
This citation shows that SRI was associated with the threat of liberal market economies.  
The CEO responded to this situation with defusing. She associated SRI with sustainable 
development and the World Summit in Johannesburg, distancing it from the United States and 
other liberal market economies. She then reformulated SRI so that it mirrored the strategy 
adopted during the Quiet Revolution, namely as a tool to restore social order and economic 
autonomy: “Abuse, lies and exploitation of children make me really angry. I want to restore 
justice, I want to change the power balance”. She defused the threat of liberal market 
economies when she framed the adoption of SRI as an act of ‘empowering people for a 
common social cause’. This strategy increased the desirability of SRI and facilitated the 
transfer to Quebec.  
The team that launched ARESE in the mid-1990 perceived threats to the development of 
SRI in France. All the interviewed analysts who were employed at ARESE in its early stage 
of development agreed that there was much uncertainty around SRI in France in 1997 and 
1998.  In fact, a market study conducted by the founder/CEO prior to the launch of ARESE 
concluded that the French market was not yet ready for SRI. Among other factors, the 
relatively small stock market in France was perceived as a threat to SRI because it was 
unattractive for investors to pay for social and environmental information on only 40 or 120 
firms, which was the size of the two main French financial indexes (respectively called ‘CAC 
 21
40’ and ‘SBF 120’). Few customers were expected to be interested in such a small asset 
management market. 
ARESE procured funding and developed a business model in spite of these threats. 
Firstly, the small number of firms allowed ARESE to use a more elaborate methodology and 
to spend more time obtaining in-depth information about French firms. After three years, 
ARESE analysts had developed relationships with key managers from virtually all of the CAC 
40 corporations, which allowed them to conduct long interviews and to obtain high quality 
information about the firms’ social and environmental policies and programs. This 
information constituted a key advantage on the SRI market since foreign competitors often 
obtained only very little material or a 20 minutes phone interview. Secondly, the small market 
size pushed ARESE toward the search for a methodology that used extra-financial 
performance as leverage for financial performance. This orientation was interesting to many 
mainstream investors beyond the small segment of religious or morally oriented investors. It 
gave ARESE a competitive advantage. Thirdly, while many evaluation agencies or SRI 
products were investor driven, the weak interest that the French financial market initially 
showed for SRI gave ARESE more autonomy to make its own methodology and avoided 
dependency on client needs:  
“The customers never helped us and, paradoxically, that was one of our main strengths. In 
other countries, customers were asking for specific studies, saying: “I want that, and I will 
pay only for that”. In France, we proposed something and the customer had to adopt to it.” 
(ARESE, Analyst B) 
        
These three examples illustrate how the ARESE team progressively turned the two initial 
threats into advantages during the transfer process. 
 
Coupling 
Coupling is the act of combination. Individuals engage in coupling when they combine a 
foreign business practice with a widely accepted element in the host society. The purpose of 
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doing so is to make the foreign business practice more useful or legitimate in this context. 
Much like hybridization (Zeitlin & Herrigel 2000) and bricolage (Campbell 2004), coupling 
consists in attaching another element to the foreign business practice. This element can be a 
local practice, a piece of a belief system, or a concept with high symbolic value. It could also 
be a person or an organization that confers legitimacy or value upon the foreign business 
practice. 
The French case provides many instances of coupling. The foreign SRI practice was 
combined with elements that were familiar to French managers, which helped solve technical 
problems and also provided legitimacy to the practice. Elements such as the European 
Framework for Quality Management (EFQM), the well-established principles from Total 
Quality Management (TQM), and a very basic description of firms’ stakeholders were indeed 
used to construct the methodological tool for corporate social evaluation.  Moreover, the 
decision to name ARESE a ‘social rating organization’ also contributed to adapting SRI to the 
new context. The notion of rating captures the standard logic of financial markets.  Outside 
France, providers of extra-financial information used more fuzzy labels such as ‘research 
offices’ and ‘social information provider’. The term ‘social rating organization’ is clearly 
aligned with the financial domain and facilitated communication with investors. The 
combination of SRI with TQM and financial concepts also facilitated acceptance in the 
evaluated firms, especially by managers trained in Total Quality Management. Some of them 
decided to use ARESE’s questionnaires to design their own internal CSR policy: 
“Personally, I found the ARESE referential [SRI evaluation tool] to be well designed. As 
the underlying framework of that approach was satisficing, we decided to use it! You can 
consider social rating to be an external constraint and adopt a compliance attitude by 
simply providing the requested information. Well, we decided to adopt a positive attitude 
and use rating as a managerial exercise.… So, we use the ARESE referential as an internal 
management tool.” (Director of quality management, bank of the CAC 40) 
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In the case of FIR, coupling was used extensively to legitimize the transfer of SRI. One 
way that this occurred was through the creation of strategic alliances with key individuals and 
organizations. At the preliminary stages, the CEO contacted a number of stakeholders that 
could either facilitate the transfer by associating with the project or block the transfer by 
distancing themselves from it. Her strategy to mobilize alliances was to identify elements that 
had importance to each stakeholder and combine them with SRI. This process of coupling 
generated an SRI practice with support from many key stakeholders. The elements of SMEs 
and environmentally preventive technologies were added in this way. Through coupling, the 
CEO overcame the pockets of resistance in Quebec society (see section on filtering). She 
selected board members that represented powerful stakeholders, which legitimized the 
transfer and prevented the formation of a coalition against it. For instance:  
“We made an agreement with the Responsible Investment Network of Quebec and all the 
community organizations in Quebec to develop a common approach to sustainable 
development. The government officials who were most reluctant to support the project 
saw immediately that we were reinforcing an organization that they wanted to abolish.” 
(CEO of FIR)   
 
In coupling FIR to strategically placed organizations in the field, the CEO facilitated the 
transfer of SRI to Quebec. 
 
DISCUSSION: CONTEXTUALIZATION, TRANSLATION AND TRANSFER  
Our empirical study examined the transfer of the American business practice of socially 
responsible investment (SRI) to respectively France and Quebec. We studied the process of 
contextualization from the perspective of the individuals who undertook the transfer, 
obtaining a more detailed account of the process than is usual for transfer studies. This 
analysis revealed a number of micro-strategies that were used in both transfers to fit the 
American business practice to the host society. These micro-strategies were (1) Filtering, (2) 
Rerouting, (3) Stowing, (4) Defusing, and (5) Coupling (see table 2 for an overview). We 
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elaborated upon each micro-strategy and showed how individuals in both cases applied them, 
fairly deliberately, to facilitate the transfer of SRI. The micro-strategies resonate with 
previous research findings and theoretical formulations of contextualization, translation and 
institutional transfer. We evaluate their contribution to these respective lines of inquiry.  
 
Contextualization 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) proposes that business practices undergo constant adaptation to 
new contexts of application. According to Bruno Latour (1996a), the success of an innovation 
depends on the capacity of actors to entangle specific dimensions of the innovation with the 
context in which it is implemented. Practices are adapted and related to dimensions of the new 
context to secure support for it (Akrich et al. 1988a, 1988b; Latour 1996a, 2005). In ANT, no 
act of contextualization is considered impossible and no business practice is expected to 
remain the same for any length of time. The object of analysis in ANT is the process through 
which individuals, ideas, and objects are coupled and decoupled in a constant process of 
contextualization (Latour 1994, 1996b, 2005). However, no assumptions are made about how 
this process unfolds or about how individuals strategically mobilize these elements. 
Our findings contribute to refining the concept of contextualization. Most importantly, 
they identify a limited range of contextualization patterns that occur during the transfer 
process. As could be expected, the object of transfer, SRI, was disentangled and re-entangled 
in the transfer process, attaching individuals, ideas and objects to SRI in a way that fit the new 
context. Our contribution consists in identifying a specific structure of disentanglement / re-
entanglement beneath the apparent freedom of association. Each micro-strategy of 
contextualization captured a particular combination of material and symbolic aspects, 
resulting in a limited range of micro-strategies. We suggest, therefore, a refined notion of 
contextualization in ANT, although this contribution may be considered biased in the favour 
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of human agency and deliberate action. We also propose additional research on 
contextualization strategies. For instance, it would be interesting to investigate which 
contextualization strategies are best suited for a given stage of translation and/or a given 
practice, and whether the same contextualization strategies apply to diffusion within the host 
society. Future studies could draw on the repertoire of micro-strategies to examine how a 
transferred business practice is subsequently re-contextualized by other actors in the host 
society.  
 
Translation 
Translation studies are conducted within Actor-Network-Theory and New Institutional 
Theory, sometimes combined under the label of Scandinavian Institutionalism. Translation 
studies look at changes that a business practice undergoes when it is implemented in another 
institutional structure. These changes occur although organizations try to imitate each other by 
importing practices from similar societies (Strang & Meyer 1994; Sahlin-Anderson 1996). 
Imitation is also facilitated by the use of ready-to-imitate packaging that is associated with 
valued ideas and successful settings, e.g., in the form of ‘best practices’ (Røvik 1996). 
Unchanged form may hold true at the discursive level, but practices tend to change once they 
are implemented in new institutional structures. Sahlin-Anderson (1996) explains, for 
instance, that “there are no ready-made models which remain unchanged as they spread” (p. 
81) and that “individuals may imitate some elements of foreign business practices and not 
others, forming and transforming ideas and experiences as they are transferred” (p. 48). 
Empirical studies lend support to her suggestions (Boxenbaum 2006; Lippi 2000).  
Among the different translation models (e.g., Campbell 2004; Czarniawska & Joerges 
1996), the most detailed is probably Sahlin-Anderson’s (2001) model of editing. She proposes 
three three editing rules to facilitate the export of a local practice, namely context, logic and 
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formulation (Sahlin-Anderson 2001: 55-57). When editing for context, individuals strip 
business practices of elements that seem to be too unique or specific to a time or country. The 
reason is that practices are more applicable and appealing to other settings when they are 
formulated in general terms. When editing for logic, individuals give business practices a 
rationalistic flavor. They assign effects to certain activities or present practices as efficient 
solutions to recognized problems. A practice that is scientifically and rationally justified is 
generally appealing. When editing for formulation, individuals give practices a narrative form 
and dramatize it. They may change labels or tell stories about the origin or application of 
practices to make them more appealing. These three editing rules enable individuals to 
translate a context-specific practice into one that is generally appealing and widely applicable.   
Our findings resonate with Sahlin-Andersen’s model and also extend it in significant 
ways. The repertoire of micro-strategies describe in detail what work actors perform when 
they edit, particularly when they edit for context. It also highlights how actors unpack 
practices in the host society, which is a dimension of translation that is often ignored in 
previous studies. For instance, we found that different elements were removed, respectively 
added, to SRI in the two societies, which suggests that it is insufficient to remove highly 
context-specific elements at the export stage. Editing is also required for import, a point that 
the literature on institutional transfers has already made. Our findings extend Sahlin-
Anderson’s work and point to future research on the relationship between packaging for 
export and unpacking for import. The repertoire of micro-strategies can be helpful as a 
starting point in this regard.   
 
Institutional transfers   
Studies of institutional transfers are conducted within the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
framework (Hall & Soskice 2001) or Business Systems Theory (Whitley 1998, 1999). This 
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line of research explains that business practices change form to fit the production regime in 
the receiving society when they are transferred across varieties of capitalism or business 
systems. The reason is that “the systemic character of institutions in advanced industrial 
societies forces institutional innovations and transfers to be organized so that they fit the 
broader institutional order” (Casper & Hancké 1999, 963). National institutions, particularly 
the economic structures, are therefore considered determinant for shaping a transferred 
business practice. There is some, though limited, recognition that individuals contribute to 
transfers as well. For instance, actors outside the state structure sponsor or pull in a foreign 
practice because they see unexpected opportunities that suit their own material or moral ends 
(Jacoby 2000: 20-21). They use various power resources available to them to do so (Casper & 
Hancké 1999: 962). For instance, individuals engage in selective emulation when they 
“choose not to adopt certain features of the original model because they conflict with local 
patterns” or when they try to legitimize changes in the host society by transferring only 
desired features of a foreign business practice (Westney 1987: 27). They engage in 
hybridization when they combine a foreign practice with local elements to make the transfer 
meaningful or legitimate in the host society (Pieterse 1994).  
The two strategies of selective emulation and hybridization are both embraced within 
the repertoire of micro-strategies that we identified. Our contribution to the literature on 
institutional transfers is a detailed description of the work that individuals engage in at a 
micro-level of analysis, combined with a more exhaustive and refined repertoire of how to 
transfer practices across varieties of capitalism or business systems. The five micro-strategies 
that we identified are fully compatible with varieties of capitalism and business systems 
theory, but point to the need for research on the role of individuals in institutional transfers 
(see also Tempel & Walgenbach, forthcoming). Future research may investigate the 
construction of Varieties of Capitalism from the bottom-up to explain why divergent business 
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system persist in spite of increasing diffusion of practices worldwide. This avenue of research 
may also illuminate why some attempts to transfer practices across dissimilar societies fail 
while others succeed. 
  
CONCLUSION 
This study examined the transfer of the American business practice of Socially Responsible 
Investment (SRI) to France and Quebec, illuminating two contextualization processes. The 
findings show how individuals selected and mobilized local institutions to fit SRI to the new 
context, and they revealed that SRI took different form in the two transfer processes. This 
finding is consistent with previous studies. A practice that is transferred to two societies takes 
different form because the institutional structures in the two host societies are different. Our 
findings are based on only two case studies. Other case studies, conducted in parallel, would 
help determine whether the institutional structures (partially) explain the observed differences 
in the contextualized form of SRI. 
The study also revealed that the same five micro-strategies were employed in both 
transfer processes. The SRI practice took different shape in the two host societies, but the 
strategies used in the process of contextualize were similar. This finding suggests some 
general patterns of contextualization. Additional research would be required to determine 
whether the repertoire of micro-strategies is generalizable beyond SRI transfers, francophone 
entrepreneurs, and contemporary time. We compared our findings to previous research on 
contextualization, translation, and institutional transfer and found that the micro-strategies 
extended previous research on these topics. They also linked disparate lines of inquiry to one 
another. The micro-strategies bridge the individual level of analysis with the societal level of 
analysis. Most importantly, they show how individuals engage creatively and strategically 
with institutional structures to produce the kind of outcomes that have been identified in 
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previous research on cross-national transfers. They also contribute to explain how divergences 
between varieties of capitalism are maintained. Finally, each strategy combines institutional 
and symbolic aspects with practice and strategy, which makes it possible to simultaneously 
address dimensions that have often been addressed separately.   
There is an interesting avenue for future research in investigating the role of micro-
strategies in successful transfers. Our study is limited in this regard because we only studied 
successful transfers. A failure case would be required to identify which variable, or which 
combination of variables, lead to successful transfers, particularly across dissimilar societies. 
Future research may investigate the possibilities and limitations associated with individual 
strategies. For instance, can the skilful use of micro-strategies enable transfers that are 
otherwise destined to fail? In contrast, under which structural conditions is the skilful use of 
micro-strategies to no avail? Perhaps the presence of certain structural factors is required to 
successfully transfer a foreign business practice, e.g., a major event, institutional upheaval in 
the host society, or a budding social movement. There is certainly a need for testing whether 
the use of micro-strategies, perhaps in combination with other factors, can explain why some 
transfers fail and others succeed. This insight is important theoretically, but it is equally 
important for practitioners who struggle to transfer practices across institutional divides.  
The repertoire of micro-strategies makes explicit the practice of contextualization, 
which is often taken for granted in studies of cross-national transfers. This explicit account 
can be valuable to managers who engage in the practice of transfering practices across 
societies. For instance, the transfer of business practices through ‘learning expeditions’ abroad 
is becoming an industry of its own (e.g. www.wdhb.com), one that can be fairly costly for 
firms. Using the repertoire of micro-strategies, managers can transfer business practices more 
cost-effectively. They can identify favourable conditions for a transfer and tailor practices to 
different business contexts. The empirical findings also provide insights into the processes 
 30
through which programs and practices on corporate social responsibility or corporate social 
citizenship can be adapted for the purpose of intangible assets creation (Gardberg & Fombrun 
2006). 
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 Figure 1. Keyword search on ‘Socially Responsible Investment’ or ‘Investissement Socialement 
Responsable’ in major newspapers in United States, France and Quebec. 
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Table 1. Key events in the transfer of SRI from the United States to France.and to Quebec 
 
Stage of  translation Selection Objectification Materialization 
Key events in the SRI 
transfer from US to 
France 
? [1992-1995] The CEO of ARESE is working as a consultant for a 
small consulting company in California. 
? [1994] Group of French bankers travel to the US to study the 
evolution of corporate governance and meet SRI investors. 
? [1995] French investors attend a seminar on innovation in the US 
financial sector where they are exposed to SRI.  
? [1995-1996] French banks fund a study on implementing SRI in 
France. Meetings with SRI agencies in Europe and the US, French 
opinion leaders in the financial sector, and religious investors. 
? [1996] Market study on 
social rating organizations 
in France. 
? [1996] Presentation of a 
business plan to French 
financial institutions in 
order to obtain funding for 
the creation of a social 
rating organization 
? [1996-1997] Development of SRI 
methodology with experts and students. 
? [1997] Analysts are hired to collect and 
process data.  
? [1997–1998] Data are collected in firms; 
first SRI ratings are done. 
? [1998] First complete SRI rating of 
French companies; refinement of the 
methodology; orientation toward the 
European market. 
Key events in the SRI 
transfer from US to 
Quebec 
? [2002] The CEO of FIR is managing a non-profit environmental 
protection agency in Quebec. 
? [2002] She attends the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
in Johannesburg and discusses SRI with leaders of the Quebec 
financial sector and labour unions.   
? [Fall 2002] The Committee of Public Finance, a workgroup within 
the Quebec Parliament, holds a public hearing on corporate social 
responsibility and socially responsible investment. 
? [2002-2003] CEO engages in informal discussions with actors 
involved in environmental protection and/or financing 
? [2002-2003] CEO forges 
formal partnership between 
public institutions, private 
firms, and the non-profit 
sector. 
? [2003] The Fund for Social 
Investment is formally 
launched. 
? [2003] Development of SRI policy and 
evaluation tool. 
? [2003] Analysts are hired to evaluate 
applications for socially responsible 
investment. 
? [2003] First investment decisions are 
made. 
Level of practice 
(re)definition  
Low level of definition 
Fuzzy idea, general interest, inspiration to do an SRI project 
Middle level of definition 
Consolidation of idea, making 
of a business plan 
High level of definition  
Implementation and commercial 
development of idea 
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Table 2. Micro-strategies of contextualization: definition and illustrations 
 
Micro-strategy of contextualization 
(label and definition) 
Illustrative example from the French case Illustrative example from the Quebec case 
(1) FILTERING 
Disentanglement of elements in the 
translated object that could be perceived as 
‘incongruent’ with the new context.  
? Downplay of the moral and religious connotations of 
SRI to present it as a neutral and objective investment in 
firms with long-term profitability.  
? Downplay of the profit-making elements of SRI to make 
the practice more social in scope and thus better aligned 
with the Francophone business culture.  
(2) REROUTING 
Change of meaning or function of the 
translated object in order to make it more 
useful and/or acceptable in the new 
context. 
? Transformation of SRI from a moral and political device 
to a financial tool. Instead of preventing ‘sin’ stocks 
(negative screening), SRI facilitates investment in sound 
companies (positive screening).   
? Redefinition of SRI as a means to reinforce the Quebec 
model of economic development. 
(3) STOWING 
Entanglement of the translated object with 
a social movement and/or current trends in 
the new context to facilitate its acceptance. 
? Alignment of SRI with the dilemma that French savings 
banks face in being financial investors charged with a 
mission to ensure public good and social welfare (public 
service spirit) at a time of financial liberalization. 
? Mobilization of the Life Cycle Approach to benefit from 
the momentum that this concept enjoyed at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg.  
(4) DEFUSING 
Transformation of the translated object in 
response to an existing threat in the new 
context. 
? Creation of a sophisticated methodology in which 
analysts make in-depth investigation of firms. This is 
possible in France because of relatively fewer companies 
to assess than in the United States. 
? Presentation of SRI as an extension of Quebec resistance 
to Anglophone oppression, as a way to restore social 
justice and to balance power in the financial world, while 
masking the origin of SRI in the Anglophone world.  
(5) COUPLING 
Combination of the translated object with 
a widely accepted object from the new 
context to increase the usefulness and/or 
acceptability of import into this context. 
? Use of the preexisting 'Bilan Social' and the EFQM 
framework to develop SRI methodology, including 
assessment tools, legitimate firm questionnaires, 
databases and calculations of managerial performance.   
 
? Mobilization of elements that are important to those 
stakeholders who could potentially support the transfer 
of SRI, such as ‘environmentally preventive 
technologies’ and ‘management of SMEs’.   
 
